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The Eurozone, it appears, is in a constant state of crisis. While other major economic 
players have mainly recovered from the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the Eurozone as a whole 
seems to have never escaped the economic malaise caused by that dreadful event. Perhaps more 
startling is the divergence seen within the Eurozone itself, as a few relatively wealthier, healthier 
members such as Germany and Austria pull away from the larger pack of poorer, languishing 
ones, such as Greece and Portugal. A currency union should be effective and cohesive, yet the 
Eurozone has been largely ineffective and fragmented in handling the recent onslaught of crises. 
Why is this the case, and what is it about the organization of the euro itself that has lead to these 
outcomes? To answer these sorts of questions, this paper will take as its starting point Robert 
Mundell’s seminal work on Optimum Currency Area (OCA) Theory in 1961, along with 
subsequent criteria outlined in line with this theory (Kenen, McKinnon) in order to utilize a 
particular lens through which one might approach and analyze the Eurozone’s current troubles. 
The classical OCA Theory offers seven different criteria that qualify economic areas as fit for 
sharing a common currency. This paper will reveal that understanding one criterion, the 
incidence of asymmetric shocks, is critical to deciphering Europe’s most pressing problems, 
which can be mitigated by two other OCA criteria that function as shock absorbers: labor 
mobility and fiscal integration. While returning to the 1960s to solve highly contemporary 
problems may seem counterintuitive, this rather original method provides particular insights on 
the Eurozone’s difficulties that may have otherwise been overlooked, and also furnishes a rich 
intellectual exercise in the theory and its application. The structure of this paper is as follows: (1) 
I will review the pillars of classical OCA Theory, as first put forth by Mundell, McKinnon, and 
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Kenen; (2) discuss the various criteria by which these theorists define the Optimum Currency 
Area and identify those that are most critical; (3) touch upon briefly the presence of asymmetry 
in the Eurozone; (4) discuss Eurozone labor mobility in-depth; (5) analyze the depth of fiscal 
integration within the Eurozone; and finally, (6) offer some concluding remarks concerning the 
future viability of the euro.  
 
II. ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY 
 
 The literature concerning this topic can be broken down into roughly two categories: (1) 
classical OCA theory as defined by Mundell, McKinnon, and Kenen (which I will emphasize), 
and (2) adjustments to and application of the theory with respect to the European experience. As 
shall become evident, the debate concerning OCA Theory is wide ranging and diffuse, yet also 
centers around a few key economists such as Mundell and McKinnon who will return to the 
discussion as their arguments evolve.  
 
I. Classical OCA Theory  
While Robert Mundell may not have been the first to examine the appropriate jurisdiction 
and external arrangements of a currency, he is widely considered to be the father of a more 
precise theory, that of the Optimum Currency Area (OCA), and the champion of its classical 
development in the 1960s. His 1961 paper on the topic is the basis for the development of a 
strain of economic theory that can help us analyze through a unique lens the very complex 
monetary questions of the mid-20th century up to the present day.  
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Mundell presents as his starting point a balance-of-payments issue that is bound to arise 
consistent given the current international monetary system of fixed exchange rates and rigid 
wage and price levels. These factors have impeded that terms of trade from “fulfilling a natural 
role in the adjustment process” (Mundell, 1961). Thus, Mundell sees a system that, while 
functional, is failing to reach a healthy, self-corrective equilibrium. The most obvious solution is 
a system of national currencies connected by fluctuating exchange rates, in which depreciation 
takes the place of unemployment during external balance deficits and appreciation occurs instead 
of inflation during times of surplus. This seemingly elegant and straightforward solution, 
however, has much larger implications, and demands interrogation: should all currencies float 
freely, and, if not, whose currencies should fluctuate against one another versus those that remain 
tightly pegged. And furthermore, in the context of European integration, is a common currency 
preferable to a system of fixed exchange within the bloc? At the heart of this matter lies the 
ultimate question: “What is the appropriate domain of a currency area?”  
Mundell illustrates the two situations in which the burden of adjustment to balance-of-
payments disequilibria falls on either the surplus or deficit area, depending on the underlying 
currency system. In the example of fluctuating national currencies, the central bank of a surplus 
nation will move to raise interest rates to stem inflationary pressures, meaning the burden of 
adjustment falls on the deficit nation to cut prices, resulting in higher unemployment. On the 
other hand, the central bank of a single currency across an uneven economic terrain has the 
ability to set the pace of inflation in its willingness to allow unemployment in deficit regions. In 
this second case, expansionary monetary policy is used to attack unemployment while 
aggravating inflationary pressure in the surplus region. Thus, the central bank of a currency area 
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must make familiar decisions in choosing between unemployment and inflation, which inevitably 
favors certain pockets of their jurisdiction over others.  
In some cases, then, currencies might better correspond to real economic activity and 
phenomena that are transnational yet not wholly applicable to, say, a national boundary. Mundell 
gives as an example the United States and Canada. The two have their own currencies that 
fluctuate against one another, but they also have similar, geography based divisions within their 
own diverse economies; the East produces cars, while the West produces lumber. Mundell 
disrupts his equilibrium by adding a technological change to the automotive industry that creates 
surplus cars, and a shift in demand to the West’s lumber. Unemployment rises in the East, both 
in Canada and the US, while inflationary pressures build in the West. The central banks of each 
country must make decisions based on the Phillips Curve trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment, unable to tackle both using monetary policy. Meanwhile, the US and Canadian 
dollars continue to fluctuate against one another, failing to offset, however, the imbalances 
between East and West. This example demonstrates a case in which the management of two, 
disparate economic regions is improperly assigned or connected to a single jurisdiction, political 
rather than economic in nature. A single currency for the East and another for the West would 
provide a more appropriate division of management in which the central bank of each region 
could more aptly respond to balance-of-payments and other issues. Furthermore, the East-West 
exchange rate would fluctuate according to real underlying economic movements, ensuring, 
along with monetary policy adjustments, the functionality of an elegant and automatic system 
that returns to equilibrium. Thus, Mundell states, “Today, if the case for flexible exchange rates 
is a strong one, it is, in logic, a case for flexible exchange rates based on regional currencies, not 
on national currencies. The optimum currency area is the region.”  
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Defining the appropriate region, then, is the next task. In short, the stipulations Mundell 
gives in this original iteration of OCA Theory are as follows,  
 (i.) “A domain within which exchange rates are fixed and asking: What is the appropriate 
domain of a currency area?”  
(ii.) “An essential ingredient of a common currency, or a single currency area, is a high 
degree of factor mobility”  
(iii.) Problem of asymmetric shocks and how they are mitigated—shock absorbers (capital, 
labor mobility, fiscal transfers, etc.) in lieu of Monetary policy, which is universal and can only 
respond to symmetric shocks.  
Mundell shifts his discussion to a more practical application of his arguments, in which 
he draws on current events in Western Europe to demonstrate the relevance of OCA theory. Even 
at the time of writing in 1961, many asked how mobile must labor actually be to fulfill this 
defining requirement of the optimum currency area. Some argued that by this metric Western 
Europe was disqualified, while others acknowledged the need for improvement in both labor and 
capital mobility yet did not find such challenges insurmountable. Mundell then clarifies his 
argument to make explicit his disinterest in advocating for the “balkanization” of the world into 
smaller currency areas. He recognizes the potentially high costs of currency translation, thin 
currency markets, and reduced liquidity value of such a fragmented arrangement. Mundell’s 
early contribution to this previously underdeveloped concept would prove to be, as we shall see, 
quite catalyzing to this vein of economic thought.   
In a response to Mundell, whose paper had caused much activity in the wider community 
of economists, Ronald McKinnon critiques and expands the criteria of optimality in a currency 
area. Optimum, he states, refers to a single currency area within which monetary-fiscal policy 
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and flexible external exchange rates can accomplish the following: (i.) an economy at full 
employment, (ii.) a balanced international payments account, and (iii.) a stable internal price 
level.  
McKinnon constructs a relatively straightforward model in which there are two actors, a 
small currency area and a much larger one. The main factor that should determine a currency 
regime in the case of the small currency area is its composition between what McKinnon calls 
“tradable” and “non-tradable” goods—products that have the potential for import/export versus 
those that, for various factors, must remain within the domestic economy. The tradable goods are 
most influenced by external price setting by the larger actor, i.e. global market prices, via 
existing exchange rates, and are less affected by domestic economic policy. On the other hand, 
non-tradable goods find their pricing endogenously, and are therefore more sensitive to fiscal-
monetary policy action, while less influenced by foreign pricing. This phenomenon is relatively 
easy to observe even in the much more complex economic reality in which we live: the prices of 
many commodities are global and market-driven, while the compensation for certain services are 
very closely tied to the country, province, or even city/town in which they are performed. Thus, 
the terms of trade are largely immune to domestic economic policy when prices of tradable 
goods are set externally.  
There are two ways, then, that a trade balance can be maintained: (a,) external exchange 
rate flexibility, or (b,) internal fiscal-monetary policy. McKinnon asks us to observe two cases in 
which the share of tradable to non-tradable goods varies, while testing each trade balance 
maintaining policy to see which works best.  
In case 1, we are to consider a small domestic economy with a high share of imported and 
exported tradable goods and a low share of non-tradables, all operating under a flexible exchange 
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rate. If the domestic currency devalues by 10%, prices of imported and exported goods (tradable 
goods) will decrease to reflect this exchange rate shift. Production of tradables increases, while 
consumption of foreign goods decreases (as imports become relatively more expensive), thus 
correcting the balance of payments deficit. This fails to create a system that achieves objective 
(iii.), a stable internal price level, as the prices of non-tradable goods remain out of step.  
In a more extreme case, one could consider a completely open economy, where all the 
prices of goods are determined externally. This would require, during periods of deficit, the 
reduction of all expenditures while output remains the same, yielding painful and potentially 
unacceptable bouts of unemployment. McKinnon concludes that as one moves across the 
spectrum from closed to open economies, exchange rate fluctuation becomes less effective and 
more damaging to internal price stability. If one adds the additional worry of speculative 
currency movements in a flexible exchange rate regime, fixed exchange rates become even more 
attractive. In short, exchange rate flexibility where prices are externally set necessarily forces 
reduction in expenditures or real income in order to improve the balance of trade.  
In case 2, the share of non-tradable goods in a small economy is quite high. As the 
currency devalues 10% as it did in the first case, tradable goods similarly increase in price while 
having far less impact on the wider domestic economy. The exchange rate adjustments have now 
helped the international account balance by raising prices on tradable goods in order to induce 
their increased production. Meanwhile, using fiscal-monetary policy to correct the balance of 
payments deficit will severely affect the large, non-tradable goods sector, while providing little 
gain to tradables, and is therefore a non-existent policy tool.  
Case 1 represents a “conflict economy,” in which exports are large enough to dominate 
the generation of domestic income. In a fixed exchange rate regime, times of low income yield 
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current account deficits, bringing about unemployment while maintaining price stability. In a 
floating exchange rate system, the trade effects on employment are minimalized, but at the 
expense of large price fluctuations.  
There are many important monetary implications of McKinnon’s model. If the currency 
area is large enough and is composed of enough non-tradable goods, pegging the value of the 
domestic currency to these non-tradables will supply sufficient monetary liquidity value to 
inhabitants and allow for saving and capital accumulation. In such a case, flexible exchange rates 
can then help the balance of payments without severely affecting domestic price stability.  
Yet, if we consider a small currency area where tradable goods make up the bulk of the 
domestic economy, pegging the currency to non-tradables is a much less appealing option, as the 
basket to which the currency is pegged is atypical and inappropriate compared to the larger 
economy. This currency area must essentially peg the value of its currency to imports, or, in 
truth, to the foreign currency. To expand this case, consider a system of many small currency 
areas that trade extensively with one another. They will all peg their currencies to a similar 
basket of goods or, by extension, to one another’s currencies. To maintain the perception of the 
liquidity value of said currencies, a fixed exchange rate will necessarily emerge. Capital 
movement becomes more necessary to promote specialization among this group of currency 
areas, and, as a consequence, a common currency will become more attractive.  
If, on the other hand, we have a small currency area with an unconvincing peg to the 
larger external area(s), this currency’s liquidity value is reduced. Savers naturally look to hold 
more liquid currencies, spurring domestic nationals of the small improperly pegged nation to 
horde foreign bank balances. In effect, smaller countries with weak currencies will finance the 
balance of payments deficits of larger countries with more desirable currencies. Capital outflows 
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will occur from countries that typically have a higher need for that capital, and authorities will be 
forced to institute strict exchange rate policies as well as potential capital controls.  
By contrast, McKinnon argues, short-term capital outflows are much less frequent 
amongst small currency areas with perceived equal liquidity value in a floating exchange rate 
system. This yields monetary-fiscal policy supposedly more effective as capital is less 
responsive.  
McKinnon then gives an example of these varying cases in West Virginia, asking if a 
separate currency might be appropriate in fixing various economic maladies. West Virginia is 
small and has an abundance of non-tradable goods expressed as labor unemployment. Giving 
West Virginia its own floating currency would do little to mitigate the balance of payments 
issues, as prices would be thought of and expressed relative to the dominant U.S. The currency 
could not be pegged to restrictedly internal activity (non-tradables), as this would not be 
accepted as an appropriate store and measure of value within the West Virginian economy. Yet, 
if West Virginia were larger, had a larger non-tradable sector, and, thus, carried weight in price 
setting, a separate currency may work to reach full employment and payments balance in the 
absence of factor mobility.  
Finally, McKinnon wraps up his discussion by reaffirming that Mundell’s criteria for 
internal factor mobility is accurate, if a bit simplified. McKinnon envisions a case where factor 
mobility inter-industry also plays an important role in determining currency area optimality.  
In his now seminal paper, presented in 1966 at a Conference at the University of 
Chicago, Peter Kenen responds to both Mundell and McKinnon in their attempts to construct (or 
deconstruct) the various criteria for the optimality of the currency area. It is, along with the other 
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two, considered a foundational or classical text of OCA Theory, from which the following and 
contemporary debates on the subject are derived.  
Kenen initiates his discussion with an overview of Mundell’s original arguments. He 
highlights specifically Mundell’s stripped down East-West model, in which either half of the US 
and Canada has similar economic compositions that appear to call for separate, non-politically 
expressed currency jurisdictions. In this example, however, Mundell continued beyond this East-
West division and proposed that with sufficient labor mobility between the two, these countries 
could form an optimum currency area, as labor offsets current account imbalances. Kenen takes 
issue with this, however, stating, “when regions are defined by their activities, not 
geographically or politically, perfect interregional mobility requires perfect occupational 
mobility. And this can only come about when labor is homogenous (or the several regions 
belonging to a single currency area display very similar skill requirements)” (44). This will be 
among the first of many issues to arise concerning Mundell’s insistence on labor mobility’s 
ability to bring about balance in international payments. And this also calls to attention that 
under these assumptions a currency area must be always be small, so as to be “coextensive with 
the single-product region” (44). However, the proposition of such a multitude of areas and 
corresponding currencies is highly unattractive, especially given McKinnon’s addition of the 
necessity for stable-valued liquid currency. He points out the potential susceptibility of such an 
arrangement to erratic exchange rate fluctuations, thin currency markets that offer little liquidity, 
and higher transaction costs.  
Kenen then shifts his argument to consider “economic sovereignty,” something he 
believes has been insufficiently explored by Mundell and McKinnon. He states, “[f]iscal and 
monetary policy must go hand in hand, and if there is to be an ‘optimum policy mix,’ they should 
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have the same domains. There should be a treasury, empowered to tax and spend, opposite each 
central bank” (45). This statement reverberates through the decades since, resonating with 
extreme prescience given the subsequent developments towards monetary union in Europe. 
Kenen highlights a variety of issues governments might run into were the fiscal policy 
jurisdiction larger than that of the monetary structure (which, of course, is just the opposite of the 
case in Europe today.) He then discusses the benefits that a number of small single-product 
regions might reap if they were managed under one centralized fiscal system. He states,  
 
If, further, a fiscal system does encompass many such regions, it may actually contribute 
to internal balance… it is a chief function of fiscal policy, using both sides of the budget, 
to offset or compensate for regional differences, whether in earned income or in 
unemployment rates. The large-scale transfer payments built into fiscal systems are 
interregional, not just interpersonal, and the rules which regulate many of those transfer 
payments relate to the labor market, just like the criterion Mundell has employed to mark 
off the optimum currency area. (47) 
 
The implications of this argument are hard to overstate. He concludes that a fiscal system 
“should be coextensive with (or no larger than) a single, if non-optimal, currency area” (47-8). 
Kenen goes further than Mundell and McKinnon in asking, if the optimum currency area is 
undetermined, so too is the fiscal area, which should be aligned to the former. In adding the level 
of fiscal integration to the OCA criteria, Kenen opened up the debate further, asking that one 
consider both fiscal and monetary jurisdictions as more than just expressions of political 
sovereignty.  
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Kenen stipulates another set of criteria for optimality related to economic diversification. 
He argues that a more diversified economy is less prone to exogenous, balance of trade shocks, 
and therefore, when a reduction in demand for said country’s exports occurs, is less likely to 
experience “imported” unemployment. Furthermore, the links in such a diversified economy 
between external and internal demand will be weaker, serving to blunt the aggregate affects of 
both positive and negative shifts in exports, rather than reinforce external movements within the 
domestic economy, as is often the case in less diversified economies.  
Kenen concludes finally by suggesting that fixed rates are most appropriate to well-
diversified economies, serving to average out shocks, stabilize domestic capital formation, 
minimize damages in the external account, and maximize the potential for labor mobility. He 
makes one final, precautionary requirement, “[c]ountries with fixed rates have also to be armed 
with potent and sophisticated internal policies” (54). There is no doubt that Kenen contributed 
massively to the development and our collective understanding of the potential optimum 
currency area.  
 
II.        Adjustments and Application 
In his pivotal paper in 1969 (published in 1973), Mundell returns to the debate and moves 
out of the theoretical foundation he laid almost a decade prior to comment on the current state of 
the international monetary and financial system, particularly in relation to Europe. In the present 
situation (1969), all European Economic Community exchange rates and units of account are 
essentially quoted in terms of US dollars. The dollar exchange rate is calculated and fixed, 
supposedly, based on the gold content of say the franc versus that of the dollar. However, 
markets operate under the supply and demand of a particular currency, driving its value in 
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various directions, prompting central banks to intervene in currency markets to maintain 
exchange rates within a narrow band of fluctuation. European currencies, each having a 
relatively fixed exchange rate to the US dollar, are also then fixed to one another. If one Italian 
lira is equal to X amount of US dollars, and the French franc Y amount of dollars, then the lire-
franc exchange rate is X relative to Y. European currencies are pegged to one another through a 
US dollar intermediary, which is providing the basis for tighter European economic integration.  
The pervasiveness of the US dollar in their own jurisdictions is at present a complicated 
reality for European central banks. In considering questions of balance of payments, one 
observes the necessity of European central banks to hold adequate US dollar reserves and 
intervene in their own currency markets to react to that which threatens to change the current 
exchange rate arrangement. If the central bank allows too much fluctuation in its reserves, which 
may be a necessary phenomenon, markets become skeptical of the durability and likelihood of 
the central bank’s commitment to its stated monetary policy, out of which arises speculation and 
further pressure on said currency. In such a system, central banks can either fix the money supply 
and allow the price to fluctuate, or they can fix the price of money and adjust the supply 
accordingly—all major actors have opted for the latter. Yet, central bank action, regardless of 
arrangement (fixed or floating), can only mitigate the inherent weakness or susceptibility of a 
currency up to a point. In recent experience, Europe has suffered from misaligned fluctuations in 
exchange and interest rates that indicate a system in disorder, particularly in the case of 
fragmented and unstable financial markets, which has severely affected economic performance.  
Europe, Mundell observes, is operating in a system that leaves its exchange rates, and by 
extension, its central banks, the “hostage of any monopolistic attack” (Mundell, 1969, pg. 5). 
Yet, to allow for wider fluctuation would upend the progress made toward deeper European 
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integration. It is not per se the current exchange rate arrangements that cause these enduring 
threats, but the current arrangement of the currencies themselves as assigned to their jurisdictions 
that are at fault. Mundell states,  
 
The larger the currency area the greater is the resistance of the exchange rate to any given 
economic disturbance. But the European currencies now cover too small a domain of 
contract and information to resist the social disturbances to which they maybe subject. 
The same argument holds with respect to the movements of funds controlled by the giant 
international corporations. A wider currency area; with the exchange rate taken out of 
politics, would ensure protection against disturbances arising in a world in which big 
companies, big labor unions and large international banks can threaten the viability of the 
national currency. (6) 
 
Thus, the universe of small European currencies is, in fact, rendered incapable of governing the 
movements of the larger and more international economic and monetary system that has emerged 
in the post-war experience. European currencies, central banks, and even central governments 
are vulnerable to a system of which they are no longer at the center. Rather, it is the US dollar 
that has emerged as by far the dominant force, along with that nation’s international banks and 
corporations. The incredible demand for US dollars, the value by which all relatively important 
economic actors now measure themselves, as well as the surge in Eurodollars facilitated by 
American financial behemoths, has, over the past few decades, undermined the monetary 
sovereignty of European states.  
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 The solution to restoring monetary sovereignty to European governments, Mundell 
argues, lies within the creation of a European money. The major negative consequence of such a 
bold move, he is quick to note, is the loss of individual national sovereignty, of which currency is 
often the most important expression. Yet, he argues, when one observes the wider economic and 
political structure of the post-war world, it is clear that that sovereignty for Europe is already 
slipping. The question is whether this power should be ceded to the United States or rather a 
“common European enterprise” (10). Mundell goes on to formulate a rough draft for the creation 
of this common currency, including its political, social, legal, and economic justifications.  
 This paper is critical for a number of reasons. It is an important shift away from the 
theoretical discussions surrounding optimum currency areas, and suggests that the economic 
rationale for forming a currency area may exist beyond the rather limited initial criteria of OCA 
theory. Mundell also ultimately implicitly relies on McKinnon’s argument that size of an 
economy (and its corresponding currency) is a critical criterion of optimality. Comparing the size 
of the US and its multinational actors with European ones, Mundell concludes that fixed 
exchange rates among smaller regions/nations in Europe can help counter structural vulnerability 
to the US’s dominance.  
It is in combining the theory and the geopolitical realities of the 1960s that one fully 
understands the path towards the euro, and why that path may have involved shirking the 
requirements of optimality in the short run in the interest of achieving other, longer term goals. 
That the euro may have arrived before meeting OCA criteria (due to aforementioned factors) 
helps one understand the contemporary European situation, and how Europe might move 
towards greater optimality in the future.   
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In 2002, McKinnon exposed what he believed were contradictory arguments inherent in 
the Optimum Currency Area Theory as first defined by Mundell, compared to his position and 
support for the creation of the euro. While Mundell clearly did not support the “balkanization” of 
the world’s currency areas, his arguments, according to McKinnon, do suggest a movement 
towards smaller, more clearly defined currency areas derived from similar underlying economic 
factors. Yet, this would be inconsistent with Mundell’s enthusiasm for the euro. In addition, 
concerning asymmetric shocks, it appears Mundell’s view had shifted. One of his original 
criteria for optimality was the incidence of asymmetric shocks, and how they affected countries 
differently within the same bloc. If economic regions reacted severely differently to a shock, they 
did not meet the requirements for optimality and so, should not form a currency area. Later, 
however, Mundell argued that a common currency could help nations recover from asymmetric 
shocks by better reserve pooling and portfolio diversification. In that case, the currency area has 
already been formed under sub-optimal conditions, yet has the potential to, or effect of, making 
itself more optimal by smoothing out differences between members. The two cases, however, 
may not be so contradictory. Mundell believes a currency area can induce its own optimality 




Through my own efforts, which are by no means exhaustive, I seek to assess the viability 
of the euro as it stands today, emphasizing the interplay between the currency’s composition of 
disparate states and the structure of its supranational institutions. My analysis derives from a 
very specific branch of economic thought principally developed in the 1960s known now as 
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Optimum Currency Area (OCA) Theory, during which time a group of thinkers vigorously 
debated the “appropriate size of the currency area” based on various, and varying, criteria. This 
is known as formative or “classical” OCA Theory, which has already been discussed at length in 
the preceding section of this paper. At the time, its consequences were seemingly constrained to 
the theoretical realm, yet it is clear now that this strain of economic thought has become 
increasingly relevant in the mainstream given major economic, political and social change. 
Despite the explosion of literature on the topic since the classical period, particularly related to 
the euro, the debate has strayed far from the original theory. Thus, I will revisit the classical 
thinkers, Mundell, McKinnon, and Kenen, and apply their original criteria to the present day 
European situation. This method, aside from providing a rich intellectual experiment, will deliver 
insights overlooked by those lost in later iterations of and deviations from the original theory.  
After a thorough reading of the classical OCA canon, I have produced these following 
criteria on which my analysis will be based:  
 the degree of labor mobility relative to wage and price flexibility (Mundell) 
 the impact of asymmetric shocks (Mundell) 
 the degree of openness and/or trade integration (McKinnon) 
 the size of an economy (McKinnon)  
 the similarity of economic composition between two economies (Kenen) 
 the degree of diversification within an economy (Kenen) 
 the level of integration among fiscal jurisdictions (Kenen) 
Having isolated these seven criteria, I will then divide them into two groupings based on their 
relation to the asymmetry qualification, from which the main substance of my analysis will be 
extracted. The criteria of focus will be systematically assessed using high-quality quantitative 
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and qualitative data. The sources for this assessment include official EU reports and databases, 
publications from reputable international organizations, and materials from external, private 
corporations. Data used in quantitative analyses primarily comes from Eurostat, the authority on 
European statistics developed and overseen by the European Commission. Policy-oriented 
discussion and conclusions, in view of the criteria assessment, are structured around the classical 
OCA texts and pivotal European Union/Eurozone documents such as the Maastricht treaty.   
 
IV. CRITERIA IN CORRESPONDENCE   
 
The seven criteria set forth by the original classical OCA economists are clearly not 
pillars of their own separate importance, but rather form a cohesive body of requirements that are 
very much in correspondence with one another. The degree of an economy’s openness or trade 
integration is surely linked to its degree of diversification, its size, and its overall economic 
composition. Labor mobility between two OCA nations is likewise heavily dependent on a 
variety of factors, such as the composition and openness of the two economies in question. Yet 
the most unifying, and indeed universal, of these criteria is the incidence of asymmetric shocks, 
the occurrence of which is both caused by and affects the nature of the other six criteria. Were 
the incidence of asymmetry sufficiently low within a given currency area, one could conclude 
that the currency area is sufficiently optimal without much consideration of the remaining 
criteria. For the classical OCA theorists, relatively high economic symmetry, or cohesion, across 
a currency area implies a high degree of optimality.  
The central role of asymmetric shocks in classical OCA Theory is entirely fitting given 
the nature of the endeavor: to form the most appropriate monetary jurisdiction based on 
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underlying economic factors and forces rather than traditional political boundaries. Monetary 
policy is by definition “one size fits all”; it lacks the flexibility to attack precisely located pockets 
of inflation and/or unemployment within its mandated jurisdiction. It must rather pursue a global 
strategy that will correct inflation at the expense of employment, or vice-versa. Thus, the intra-
currency area incidence of asymmetric shocks is perhaps the most difficult situation in which a 
central banker might find himself when setting policy, being forced to choose to remedy one 
particular conflagration while fanning the flames of another. This being considered, the focus on 
asymmetry in classical OCA Theory is, then, wholly logical.  
 The other six criteria are, as I shall elucidate, only truly relevant insofar as asymmetry is 
an active concern within the currency area in question. From this starting point, the primacy of 
asymmetry relative to the other criteria, one can reasonably extrapolate that a certain dichotomy 
exists within the six in relation to the asymmetry requirement: one grouping can be said to 
qualify the heightened potential for asymmetry, while the other can be said to provide potential 
mitigation to this asymmetry (see Table 1). Of these two 
groups, it is the latter group on which this paper is focused, 
and those criteria are: (1) the degree of labor mobility, and 
(2) the level of fiscal integration. Yet, before diving head-
on into these two criteria for the remainder of this paper, it 
is worth discussing the other criteria as related to the 
incidence of asymmetric shocks in order to provide a richer 





Group 1: Qualifying Asymmetry 
- Openness or Trade Integration 
amongst members 
- Size of an Economy 
- Similarity of Economic 
Composition between members 
- Degree of Diversification within an 
Economy 
 
Group 2: Mitigating Asymmetry 
- Labor Mobility 
- Fiscal Integration 
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Degree of Openness/Trade Integration and Size 
The degree of openness or trade integration amongst members is a criterion first posited 
by McKinnon. One can infer from McKinnon’s discussion that nations sharing a common 
currency that are open and well-integrated with one another are less likely to suffer from 
asymmetric shocks than if they remained separate for a number of reasons. Economies with high 
shares of tradable goods and services have greater incentive to form currency areas, particularly 
in cases where the bulk of their trade activity occurs with neighbors of similar tradable-to-non-
tradable compositions. There are the obvious benefits of this common currency, including 
increased liquidity value, augmented capital mobility, and greater stability in cross-border 
activity as well as the absence of “beggar-thy-neighbor” currency manipulation, all of which cut 
costs and improve trade integration amongst a group of nations already dependent on inter-
regional trade. The shared currency also provides protection against speculative attacks on a 
nation’s currency, were it to be free floating or loosely pegged, to which smaller, export-reliant 
nations are often vulnerable, meaning the realization of greater internal price stability 
(McKinnon, 1963). Such a currency arrangement among well-integrated trading nations also 
enhances business cycle synchronization and helps create a more efficient, unified single market. 
Nations joined under a common currency that trade little, that are in fact a series of fragmented 
markets, will experience a greater number of asymmetric shocks of greater severity. While intra-
currency area trade flows may adjust as a natural reaction to an asymmetric shock, the absence of 
a floating exchange rate and independent monetary policy render the alleviation of such a 
problem much more difficult. That is to say, existing trade flows offer a descriptive qualification 
rather than prescriptive remedy of asymmetry.  
 
 22 
The auxiliary requirement to the openness criterion is the size of an economy. One will 
note that the aforementioned benefits to a common currency against the incidence of asymmetric 
shocks apply most fittingly to smaller nations, which typically have higher shares of tradable to 
non-tradable goods. McKinnon envisions a case in which small areas that trade extensively with 
one another form a single currency area. These small economies were already, in a sense, price 
takers given their size and highly export-driven compositions, whose goods and services are 
priced according to a larger international market in a currency or currencies of larger areas rather 
than their own domestic currencies. For these nations, “the terms of trade will necessarily be 
immune to domestic economic policy” in smaller nations (McKinnon, 1963). Thus, the 
formation of a single currency area is particularly beneficial to a group of small, open nations 
that are each other’s primary trade partners, helping to reduce the vulnerability to specific, 
targeted shocks.  
 
Similarity of Economic Composition 
The similarity of economic composition, a criterion Kenen added, also renders the 
incidence of asymmetric shocks less, insofar as it promotes the functioning of a critical shock 
absorber: labor mobility. The justification for this requirement is relatively straightforward. 
Labor can only be transnationally mobile if the opportunities lost in the industry or sector of one 
nation exist elsewhere within the common currency jurisdiction. The similarity in economic 
composition need not tend towards identical, but instead must allow the excess labor of one 
nation to adequately deploy itself in those regions experiencing labor shortages with relative 
ease. Thus, one hundred Frenchmen laid off at a Peugeot factory in Strasbourg might easily find 
employment at the large Volkswagen factory in Stuttgart. The transition from unemployment to 
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reemployment is made relatively easier as the abundance of such opportunities exist across a 
geographic (and economic) region. Yet, an excess of gondoliers in Venice may find themselves 
out of luck should they try to find opportunities in nearby Austria. Labor is not homogenous, and 
while labor mobility is partially reliant on its ability to adapt (see section VI for a more expanded 
discussion on skill mismatches and other impediments to labor mobility), the existence of similar 
inherent economic compositions adds greatly to the cohesion, and therefore optimality of a 
currency area (Kenen, 1966). It is important to note that this criterion helps qualify the potential 
for asymmetric shocks as it relates to the effectiveness of labor mobility, yet is not a solution to 
the shocks itself. Currency area policymakers and economic actors cannot will two economies to 
structure themselves more similarly so as to alleviate sharp GDP contractions or high inflation 
specific to one country or region. Economic composition as a criterion  is then the indication 
rather than the mitigation of asymmetry.  
 
Degree of Diversification  
Kenen posited the importance of domestic/national economic diversification as a key 
determinant of optimality by reducing the potential number and severity of asymmetric shocks. 
Kenen argues three major points to support his theory that diversification at the national level is a 
critical requirement across a potentially multi-nation currency area. First, he states, “a well-
diversified national economy will not have to undergo changes in its terms of trade as often as a 
single product national economy” (Kenen, 1966). This is relatively straightforward. A nation that 
involved in a variety of activities is more likely to have a varied mix of exports, and is therefore 
less vulnerable to the likelihood of sector specific shocks. Secondly, Kenen argues, “that when, 
in fact, it [the nation] does confront a drop in the demand for its principal exports, unemployment 
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will not rise as sharply as it would in a less-diversified national economy” (Kenen 1966). While 
his first point discusses the likelihood of shocks, Kenen here adds a corollary: in a well-
diversified economy, the severity of shocks will be significantly mitigated. For example, if a 
nation is highly concentrated in the production of oil and a new way to extract a cleaner and 
more efficient energy source is suddenly developed, that nation will suffer a severe shock as the 
price of oil plummets. A neighboring country whose economy depends much less on oil exports 
will tend to fair better. While the latter’s oil production will be affected, sufficient product 
diversification within the economy will “shield the labor force from this class of shock” (Kenen, 
1966), and greatly reduce the risk of inducing larger business cycle shifts. Thirdly, “the links 
between external and domestic demand, especially the links between exports and investment, 
will be weaker in diversified national economies” (Kenen, 1966). A sufficiently diversified 
economy is more independent of, and less vulnerable to, fluctuations in the international 
macroeconomic environment. Having highlighted the importance of diversity in output, it is 
important to note that Kenen saw these attributes as critical at the national level. He is concerned 
less with the overall diversification of the single currency area formed (though this may be 
important as well), and more so will the diversification within each member state’s economy. 
Thus, according to Kenen, the greater the diversity in nations’ product mixes, the more optimal 
the currency area formed amongst them. 
Having established the auxiliary and descriptive nature of the above four criteria, it now 
becomes critical to analyze and apply the theory of the two that remain, which are the 
“mitigating” criteria. According to classical OCA Theory, it is labor mobility and fiscal 
integration that provide the most powerful and most targeted weapons to localized or 
concentrated economic malaise, depending on the type of shock at hand. It is therefore the task 
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of this paper to first briefly define and depict the Eurozone’s contemporary asymmetry 
(particularly focusing on the period including and since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis) and 
then assess the current situation concerning asymmetry’s theoretical remedies, that of labor 
mobility and of fiscal integration. As it is not the express objective of this paper to analyze and 
interrogate the widely accepted view of persistent Eurozone asymmetry, I will touch upon only 
briefly some key indicators of this asymmetry so as to then drive towards the main substance of 
this paper. 
 
V. ASYMMETRY IN THE EUROZONE 
 The signs of European asymmetry are hard to miss. Most major gauges of economic 
health and performance point to a dismal divergence amongst Eurozone members in the 
aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, as certain nations face severe contraction, rising 
unemployment, and crippling indebtedness while at the same time others expand (if only 
moderately), maintain low levels of unemployment, and keep debt well under control. These 
indicators all point to a Eurozone that, when faced with a relatively general shock (the Global 
Financial Crisis), reacted in a variety of different ways, leading to what one could aptly call an 
assortment of country-specific—and therefore by definition, asymmetric—shocks within the 
single currency area. German exports collapsed and then experienced a swift resurgence, while 
Spain suffered an implosion in its long bubbling housing sector, causing sustained economic 
hardship. Greece devolved repeatedly into successive sovereign debt crises, from which it seems 
to have still not fully escaped (Lin, 2016). Returning again to the aforementioned gauges, real 
GDP growth, unemployment, and indebtedness, a clear division amongst Eurozone nations 
presents itself with painful clarity (Figures 1, 2, 3).  
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These figures point to dramatic divergences in the trajectory of Eurozone nations, 
revealing divisions that are at once lamentable and yet all too familiar in the European discourse 
of almost the past decade. Germany, Austria, and Belgium, along with perhaps the Netherlands 
(not pictured), have managed moderate real GDP growth, relatively low unemployment, and a 
stable level of indebtedness despite the difficult economic climate on the continent. By contrast, 
toxic combinations of sharp GDP contraction, high unemployment, and skyrocketing debt have 
afflicted Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Greece. The asymmetric reverberations of a 
supposedly initially symmetric shock, the Global Financial Crisis, have turned into asymmetric 
shocks in their own right, continuing to drive wedges amongst members of the common 
currency. The monetary conundrum is, therefore, excruciatingly applicable: monetary policy 
cannot remedy the unraveling, dual in nature, occurring within its own jurisdiction, and policy 
makers must instead look to other mitigating factors to heal to the Eurozone and ensure its future 
viability. According to classical OCA Theory, it is labor mobility and fiscal integration that can 
perform this function.  
 
Figure 1 (Source: Eurostat) 
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Figure 2 (Source: Eurostat) 
Figure 3 (Source: Eurostat) 
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VI. LABOR MOBILITY  
 
 “An essential ingredient of a common currency, or a single currency area, is a high degree of 
factor mobility” (Mundell, 1961)  
 
A. The Theory 
Classical OCA Theory dictates that factor mobility, particularly the labor component, has 
the capacity to smooth and bring to equilibrium intra-area business cycles that are out of sync. 
While factor mobility refers to both capital and labor, it becomes clear that labor has been the 
more difficult of the two to achieve, and so, warrants more intense analysis. In his seminal 1961 
paper “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas,” Mundell discusses how countries may address 
current account surpluses or deficits relative to their neighbors with whom they share in 
reciprocal relationships. In a system in which each country possesses its own national currency 
with fixed exchange rates, the burden of adjustment falls on the deficit nation, whose national 
income must necessarily shrink to become once again competitive, while the surplus nation will 
try to suppress prices and maintain competitiveness. This implies a decrease in prices and wages 
in the deficit nation, the severity of which is dictated by the size of the deficit, leading to 
unemployment. In a single currency area, the burden of adjustment is decided by monetary 
authorities whose jurisdiction covers both the surplus and deficit regions, meaning authorities 
must either (a) allow for unemployment in the deficit region by maintaining relatively staid 
monetary policy, or (b) induce inflation in the surplus region in the attempt to pursue full-
employment by increasing the money supply (Mundell, 1961).  
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Given the observed reality of monetary authorities’ tendency to pursue inflation-
regulating policies, it is most often the burden of deficit nations in the currency area to suppress 
wages and undergo a painful deflationary process in which they render themselves more 
competitive relative to surplus nations, whose prices and wages are rising. This particularly 
costly rebalancing of the terms of trade can be avoided, however, through what Mundell and 
others call internal factor mobility. When, within a single currency area, one region is in surplus 
and another is in deficit, labor in particular can function as a powerful mitigating factor to 
smooth the performance of each, while crucially preserving the area’s internal price stability. 
The excess labor (unemployment) generated in the deficit region, if sufficiently mobile, can 
make up for the shortage (expressed in rising wages) present in the surplus region. The elegance 
of this solution lies in the absence of policy intervention, monetary or fiscal. Thus, within an 
optimally drawn jurisdiction of a currency, monetary expansion or contraction is theoretically 
less likely to be resorted to in times of crises. Labor mobility can then function as a more suitable 
and precise shock absorber or reflex to an asymmetric crisis than can monetary policy, which is 
clumsily “one-size-fits-all” and thus involves a painful yet familiar Phillips curve trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment.  
 
B. The European Reality 
If labor were sufficiently mobile, it would be responsive to larger movements in 
economic performance within the currency area, seeing opportunity in one region, while 
recognizing the lack thereof in another. In constructing a rather simple survey of European labor 
mobility and sensitivity to economic conditions, one can look at the share of foreign European 
Union (EU-28) nationals active in a host nation’s labor market, while also analyzing the 
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economic performance (as measured by GDP growth and national unemployment rate) of that 
nation. While clearly not all EU-28 nations are members of the Eurozone, they represent 
potential future additions to the euro and under the now long established Single Market 
Programme (SMP) comprise the whole of the wider “European labor market,” and thus, are 
included in this analysis.   
 Figure 4 (below) shows the seven nations within the Eurozone that have the largest active 
populations of foreign EU-28 Europeans between the ages of 15 and 64. These same nations, 
with the exclusion of highly irregular Luxembourg (46% of its labor force being of the studied 
population), are also those with the largest share of active foreign EU-28 nationals relative to 
their total labor forces (measured as active individuals aged 15-64) (Figure 5). Active, in this 
context, includes both the employed and unemployed. Included amongst these seven are the four 
largest Eurozone economies (Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, respectively), which are most 
likely to support large inflows, as well as medium-to-smaller economies that have accrued high 
  
Figure 4 (Source: Eurostat) Figure 5 (Source: Eurostat) 
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percentages of the studied populations relative to the size of their labor forces (Belgium, Austria, 
Ireland). The results of such an analysis relative to economic performance can help glean insight 
into how sensitive, flexible, and mobile European labor is.  
 Perhaps the most visible cases of labor market mobility are seen in Germany and Austria. 
The two make the strongest case that European labor is indeed relatively mobile and responsive 
to economic shifts.  
 
GERMANY & AUSTRIA 
In 2009, Germany suffered a particularly sharp contraction in economic activity, with real 
GDP shrinking 5.6%, a movement quite large compared to France, which contracted only 2.9% 
in the same period. The German economy’s export orientation helps explain this steep drop, as 
global demand for German goods temporarily dried up. The drop in Figure 1 reflects a relatively 
strong response to the German recession in the foreign EU-28 labor market. Yet its 
unemployment rate remained around 8% due to the swift enactment of fiscal stimulus measures 
to help combat unemployment, in which the German government essentially paid companies not 
to layoff workers (Schelkle, 2012). Though Germany experienced greater losses than some of its 
Eurozone neighbors, its recovery was by all comparative means quite robust, logging in growth 
of 4.1% and 3.7% in 2010 and 2011, respectively, and since then, has achieved moderate, if a bit 
lethargic, growth. Simultaneously, the German unemployment rate has fallen precipitously to its 
lowest levels in decades, from 8.2% 2009 Q1 (and much higher in the mid-2000s) to 4.5% in 
2015 Q3. European labor, it seems, responded enthusiastically. From 2010 Q1 to 2015 Q3, 
Germany added to its labor force approximately 700,000 foreign EU-28 Europeans aged 15-64—
a gain of 47% for the population. In this same period, the share of said population as a 
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percentage of the German labor force rose from 3.72% to 5.34%. In total, as of 2015 Q3, 
approximately 2.2 million foreign European Union individuals are active in the German 
economy. 
Austria muddled through 2009 with a smaller contraction than many of its peers at about 
3.8% of real GDP. While its rebound in 2010 and 2011, which realized gains of 1.9% and 2.8%, 
respectively, was relatively short-lived, giving way to sluggish growth since, the nation’s 
economy appears to be on solid footing, particularly compared to its Southern European 
counterparts. Its unemployment rate has fluctuated within a quite narrow band, with a high of 6% 
in 2014 Q1 and a low of 4.1% 2011 Q3—figures no doubt enviable to many in the Eurozone. If 
not quite so robust as Germany, Austria has managed to generate macroeconomic stability that 
seems sufficient to entice Europeans to relocate. From 2010 Q1 to 2015 Q3, Austria added 
150,000 foreign EU-28 Europeans aged 15-64 to its labor force, resulting in a total of 
approximately 370,000, or, an increase of 70%. As a result, the stated population currently 
accounts for 8.38% of the Austrian labor force, compared with 5.27% at the start of 2010.  
 
SPAIN AND IRELAND 
Opposite to Germany and Austria are Spain and Ireland, two nations who have large 
foreign European populations, and have suffered severe recessions and stubbornly high 
unemployment since 2009. In both nations, the global recession seems to have arrived earlier 
than in other parts of the Eurozone, causing declines in 2008 rather than 2009, as the two were 
already viewed as more risky compared to their other Eurozone neighbors. Spanish real GDP 
contracted 3.6% in 2009, a relatively moderate figure. However, in the years following, Spain 
failed to recover, and actually continued contracting. In consequence, unemployment 
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skyrocketed from 9.7% in 2008 Q1 to a high of 27.1% in 2013 Q1, and current rests at 21.3%. 
As a result, the number of active foreign EU-28 individuals in the Spanish economy declined by 
97,000 from 2010 Q1 to 2015 Q3, after an impressive growth of 300,000 in the four years 
leading up to the crisis. The massive influx of low-skill labor from Eastern Europe, particularly 
Romania, who were previously employed in the now decimated construction sector has now 
turned into mass unemployment, the effects of which continue to batter these vulnerable 
populations, as well as exacerbate the generally sour state of the Spanish labor market as a whole 
(Cala, 2010).  
Ireland experienced a massive influx of EU nationals seeking work in the lead up to the 
crisis. From 2006 Q1 to 2008 Q3, a rather brief period of two and a half years, the number of 
foreign EU-28 individuals active in the Irish economy rose from 186,000 to 280,000. Labor 
responded positively to rapid growth in Ireland, which averaged approximately 6% per annum 
from 2005 to 2007. In the years following, the share of active foreign EU nationals aged 15-64 
declined from 12.8% in 2008 Q1 to 11% in 2015 Q3, as GDP shrank and unemployment 
remained quite high.  
 
C. Making an Assessment  
How rapid and how large these flows of labor should be are, of course, the critical 
questions at hand. Yet, these have always been hard to pin down, as even Mundell knew in 1961, 
when he preferred to speak of the required degree of factor mobility to delineate a region as a 
“relative rather than absolute concept” (Mundell, 1961). However, after the preceding 
observations and analyses, one can draw certain conclusions with a degree of certainty. In order 
to qualify the Eurozone as having sufficient labor mobility, which is a critical criteria of an OCA, 
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one would expect from labor more rapid responses of greater magnitude. Thus, the Eurozone 
largely disappoints in meeting this criterion of an Optimum Currency Area, as specified by the 
classical theory.  
The case of labor responsiveness to robust German growth over the past five or so years 
provides the most compelling evidence that labor mobility is a reality in the Eurozone. Austria, 
too, bolsters this argument, as European labor migrated there in relative correlation with low 
domestic unemployment and moderate real GDP growth. An encouraging sign is the trend that 
points to increasing intra-European labor mobility, as expressed by the heightened number of 
Europeans living and working in EU nations other than their own.  
Yet, the overall picture remains quite unconvincing. As of 2015 Q3, foreign active 
Europeans (EU-28) aged 15-64 working in nations other than their own represent only 3.62% of 
the EU-28 labor force, and 3.91% of that of the Eurozone. It appears that European labor is more 
responsive to the positive dynamic, attracted by growth and low unemployment, than it is the 
negative one, in which both foreign and domestic labor leave struggling economies. Were labor 
more responsive to negative conditions, Spain, in particular, would have seen a more rapid 
decline in foreign EU labor and in its own excess labor, as reflected by unemployment. This 
leads to the larger issue of dramatically varying, and indeed divergent, national unemployment 
rates across the Eurozone. Classical OCA Theory suggests that such severe imbalances should 
not exist, or should not persist into the medium-term if labor can fulfill its mitigating roll by 
responding sufficiently rapidly to larger macroeconomic conditions. Thus, unemployment in 
Spain, which has remained above 20% since 2010, should prompt an exodus of labor to healthier 
European labor markets, such as Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Yet, this has 
not been the case, or, at least, has not happened quickly enough to alleviate the dire conditions 
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that nation, and other Southern European nations, continue to face. Indeed, the crisis has only 
made matters worse, “the dispersion of unemployment rates increased dramatically due to the 
crisis, wiping out a process of fifteen years of convergence in less than two years” (Broyer, et. 
al., 2011). The positive relationship observed in the Eurozone between the dispersion of GDP 
growth rates and regional unemployment rates reflects insufficient mobility of the labor factor. 
Thus, labor is not responding adequately to the varied economic developments across the 
Eurozone, reducing its capacity as a legitimate asymmetric shock absorber and actually 
contributing further to intra-bloc fragmentation.  
While one could reasonably conclude that classical OCA Theory may have overestimated 
labor’s asymmetric shock absorbing capacities, it is important to note that Europe is in many 
ways its own special case. Labor mobility within the Eurozone and the European Union is 
inherently challenging for a number of reasons that mainly stem from the cultural diversity of 
membership and now geographic size of the bloc. Based on regular EU-wide surveys, the most 
important reasons for lack of mobility include: distance from family, language/cultural barriers, 
lack of information, and legal and administrative barriers. There is, it seems, more hope for 
younger generations who appear more comfortable moving and working abroad, many having 
participated in the popular ERASMUS study abroad program (Broyer, et. al., 2011). While the 
EU has continued its push to combat against certain social and economic factors that hinder labor 
mobility through initiatives such as the 2000 Lisbon Treaty, progress remains slow. European 
officials, it seems, always anticipated an inherent lack of labor mobility within the euro, “labour 
mobility - that is, geographical mobility - is unlikely to form a major mechanism of adjustment 
to asymmetric shocks within the euro area” (Patterson and Amati, 1998). Yet, it seems they 
sorely underestimated the importance of its presence. In the meantime, high persistent national 
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unemployment drives painful deflationary cycles for certain European economies, leading to 
falling wages and lower standards of living there.  
In addition, it remains to be seen how socially and politically tolerable it is within Europe 
for labor to truly fulfill its asymmetric shock absorber role, which clearly requires a higher 
degree of trans-national movement and flexibility. Mundell and others envisioned a single, 
cohesive, and responsive labor market within an OCA, in which labor flows could alleviate 
temporary asymmetric shocks related to business cycle inconsistencies amongst member states. 
The reality of very large and seemingly permanent one-way flows of labor, of people, away from 
newer, smaller, and poorer member states (such as the Baltic States, Romania, etc.) towards 
more established, larger, and wealthier ones (the UK, Germany, etc.) is particularly troubling. In 
one of the most extreme cases, Latvia has lost in the past decade alone about 13% of its 
population following its accession into the EU and is on track to shrink even more dramatically 
by 2030 (Latvian Demographics, 2012). Migratory movements such as these have not only 
caused severe social and economic disturbances within the net-loss nations, but have had the 
unfortunate consequence of reigniting old suspicions and xenophobic attitudes in net-gain 
nations (particularly towards Romanians and other Eastern Europeans), a situation exacerbated 
by the intensifying extra-EU refugee situation and reflected in the rise of right-wing, anti-EU 
parties across the continent.   
If labor mobility in Europe is clearly an insufficient absorber of asymmetric shocks, and 
shows few signs of future improvement, it is then the burden of supranational fiscal policy to 
tackle the Eurozone’s most deep-rooted problems that have been driving towards its 




VII. FISCAL INTEGRATION 
 
“An efficient fiscal system must be made to span many single product regions and should be 
coextensive with (or no larger than) a single, if non-optimal currency area” Kenen, 1966 
 
A. The Theory 
Kenen recognized quite early on the need for identical monetary and fiscal jurisdictions. 
There is in every economy an “optimal policy mix” between the monetary and fiscal jurisdictions 
that, when deployed correctly and in tandem, can effectively manage, or at least strongly 
influence, the outcomes related to employment and aggregate demand. Kenen makes the 
important distinction between the applications of these two policy weapons. While monetary 
policy is invariably “one size fits all,” fiscal policy can target very specific pockets of economic 
irregularity or underperformance. He states, “if, further, a fiscal system does encompass many 
such [single-product] regions, it may actually contribute to internal balance… it is a chief 
function of fiscal policy, using both sides of the budget, to offset or compensate for regional 
differences” (Kenen 1966). Kenen goes on to make the case that large-scale transfers built into 
sophisticated fiscal systems are often closely connected to the labor market, which is a critical 
criterion delineated by Mundell (see section VI). A large budget spanning a number of single-
product regions can combat specific and localized recessions, unlike the tools within the 
monetary arsenal.  
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Kenen also introduced the concept of economic sovereignty to the classical OCA debate. 
According to Kenen, an individual country loses some of its economic sovereignty when it gives 
up the right to set its own monetary policy. The implications of this are sufficiently explicit to the 
average observer. However, in the absence of this monetary authority, should a sophisticated 
supranational fiscal system emerge, the losses of economic sovereignty may be reasonably 
justifiable. Indeed, Kenen states, “a region may come out ahead by foregoing the right to issue its 
own currency and alter its exchange rate, in order to participate in a major fiscal system” (Kenen 
1966). In addition, should the joining member be a smaller, more open economy, the nation may 
in effect regain some of this economic sovereignty by sharing in decisions concerning their 
monetary arrangement that would have been otherwise decided without them, an argument 
Mundell makes in his 1969 paper.  
 
B. The European Reality 
The development of a true supranational fiscal system in Europe has been among the 
most politically contentious propositions associated with the larger project of European 
integration. The most binding and perhaps unfortunate expression of the attempt at fiscal 
“integration,” if one were inclined to call it such, comes in the 1992 “Treaty on European 
Union,” or, more popularly, the Maastricht Treaty, and then later refined in the Stability and 
Growth Pact. Article 104c.1 reads, “Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits,” 
which are to be monitored by the European Commission. In the case that such a deficit exists, the 
Commission (104c.2) “shall examine compliance with budgetary discipline” on the basis of 
whether said deficit is (a) exception and temporary, or (b) approaching with satisfactory pace the 
“reference value” of government debt to GDP. This value is observed to be at 3% of GDP. 
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Should the Commission find in its analysis that the Member State meets neither requirement, it 
will issue a report on its findings and recommendations, which, if not adhered to, may later be 
followed by inviting the “European Investment Bank to reconsider its lending policy toward the 
Member State” or by imposing “fines of an appropriate size” (Treaty on European Union). While 
other bodies and policies exist to foster some form of overarching fiscal structure amongst the 
Eurozone, it is these sections of the Maastricht Treaty that continue to define the state of fiscal 
integration in the currency area.  
Although the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact dominate the fiscal 
agenda, incremental steps have been taken at the supranational level to help promote cohesion 
and development across the EU. The European Structural and Investment Funds, known 
collectively as ESI, is a set of five funds working together to achieve EU-wide priorities. They 
will provide around EUR 450 billion of EU funding from 2014 to 2020, focusing on high impact 
investments in areas such as infrastructure, research and development, and training/retraining 
programs. The European Parliament also launched the European Fund for Strategic Investments 
(EFSI) in mid-2015, in order to tackle the significant deficit in private investment in recent years, 
which remains 15% below pre-crisis levels. Working with previously established institutions 
such as the EIB Group, the EFSI will operate with a higher risk-taking capacity to help activate 
at least EUR 315 billion in the next three years, in an effort to also stimulate private financing in 
SMEs (ESI, EFSI Funds, 2016).  
 
C. Making an Assessment 
Considering all other classical OCA Theory criteria, the requirement for some degree of 
fiscal integration among the currency area is the one most grossly unachieved, and remains a 
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primary obstacle to solving the persistent asymmetries across Europe following the Global 
Financial Crisis. The Stability and Growth Pact has clearly been insufficient in promoting the 
right kind of domestic fiscal apparatuses capable of responding to crises. In a speech he gave in 
late-2014, ECB President Mario Draghi himself acknowledged this, saying,  
 
The importance of each country sticking to its commitments under the Stability and 
Growth Pact should therefore be beyond debate. Indeed, that a sound fiscal framework 
is necessary in a monetary union goes without saying. Whether it is sufficient to 
safeguard fiscal policy as a stabilisation tool, however, has been challenged by our 
experience during the crisis” (Draghi, 2014)  
 
The reticence surrounding the failure of the Pact is still visible, yet policymakers now are much 
more likely to recognize the faults in this kind of approach to fiscal policy. Indeed, the most 
potent policies of the Eurozone related to the fiscal realm are primarily punitive and often are 
damaging to member states that are struggling most. The regime of fiscal “discipline” comes at a 
high cost, and suggests that economic sovereignty is far from retained by national control over 
domestic budgetary matters. In the absence of a larger, supranational fiscal structure and the 
presence of rather restrictive rules concerning national budgets, Eurozone members find the 
fiscal policy tool severely blunted. A system based on austerity-oriented rules, rather than strong 
supranational institutions seems to have exacerbated for many member nations the severity of 
their own crises. As Kenen well knew, joining a monetary union required potential member 
nations to weigh losing a certain amount of economic sovereignty against the possible gains at 
stake. Autonomous and effective domestic fiscal policy, in addition to more global supranational 
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policy tools, was always the counter-argument to those who believed the loss of said sovereignty 
would be too great in sharing a common currency. It appears, however, that not only are there 
now few potent supranational fiscal weapons against asymmetry, but that nations themselves are 
quite restricted in conducting their own fiscal policy and responding to malaise within their own 
borders that may call for more drastic action. The supposed intrinsic value of fiscal policy is its 
ability to tackle more specific, idiosyncratic issues appearing in the larger economy. It is 
monetary policy that must necessarily be “one size fits all.” Yet, Eurozone nations may have also 
lost fiscal policy too, not only due to the binding Maastricht regime, but also due to the lack of 
the natural interplay between fiscal and monetary policy—the “mix” to which Kenen alluded. 
Drastic fiscal policy moving out of tandem with monetary policy may be either (1) ineffective or 
(2) damaging to the larger price stability.  
Indeed, the Global Financial Crisis has exposed the Eurozone’s deep structural issues that 
have left member nations vulnerable to asymmetric shocks, lacking the policy tools to combat 
persistent conflagrations. In fact, the policy prescriptions for some of Europe’s most severely hit 
nations ended up compounding their troubles, as rapid cuts in public spending in order to reduce 
soaring budget deficits crippled demand and propelled deflationary cycles. The austerity 
measures directly following the aftermath of the financial crisis seem to have contributed to 
divergence within the common currency, as “periphery countries” such as Greece and Portugal 
slipped further into recession and thereby damaged their own recovery (Stehn, et. al.). As 
widespread yet idiosyncratic issues continue to flare up across the Eurozone, it has become 
increasingly clear to many policymakers that better coordinated, and in fact, integrated fiscal 
policy will be necessary to ensure a brighter future for the euro. So far, however, Europe’s half-
hearted attempts at fiscal integration have yielded little for most member nations, and have failed 
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to provide the kind of larger scale fiscal transfers that Kenen believed were necessary for an 
Optimum Currency Area. While the US, a relatively well-functioning OCA, has collected taxes 
at the federal level for the past 50 years of around 17% of its GDP, the European Union currently 
collects only about 1% of its GDP. Such a small supranational fiscal budget, relative to the size 
of the crises afflicting a number of its member nations, is bound to fall short of achieving any 
truly impactful results (Feyrer and Sacerdote, 2013). Only a significant increase in the size and 
scope of the EU budget would realize the creation of true supranational fiscal policy, or, that is to 
say, the creation of true fiscal union.  
Yet, the political climate surrounding closer fiscal union remains almost toxic, and may 
continue to deteriorate. In May 2015, President Francois Hollande reiterated his calls for closer 
fiscal and political union, saying, “that which threatens us is not the excess of Europe, but its 
insufficiency” (Le JDD).  Hollande’s plan includes long discussed proposals such as a Eurozone 
government with its own budget under a new parliament accountable to the people. The 
reassertion of this now highly alternative European vision seems, however, to have been 
relegated to the back burner at best, as German and other more traditional opposition, who 
typically stress “fiscal discipline,” have all but outright rejected the idea (Dixon). Given the 
relatively weak reception of this new vision for Europe, it remains unclear whether Francois 
Hollande can unite a coalition of nations favoring centralization, such as Italy, in promoting a 
new phase of integration. Furthermore, as populist anti-European Union sentiment continues to 
grow across the bloc (not least within France itself, represented by the now popular “Front 





Throughout this paper I have sought to address the current malaise in Europe through the 
very particular lens of classical Optimum Currency Area Theory. Through this, it has been 
revealed that the Eurozone is not “optimal” or “suboptimal” for a number of reasons, chief 
among them being the straining effects of persistent asymmetry throughout the common 
currency area. It is particularly worrying to see nineteen different nations move in directions very 
different from one another, as some grow robustly and others remain mired in recession. The fate 
of those living under the common currency seems now to rely on more than ever which nation 
within the Eurozone one inhabits, a reality far from the “economic and social cohesion and 
solidarity among Member States” once envisioned in the 1992 Treaty on European Union. The 
euro is, in many ways, at a critical crossroads between further fragmentation and a push towards 
greater union. Without action, current economic dynamics seem sure to result in the former. Yet, 
this paper has also identified areas of improvement for the Eurozone that may alleviate these 
very large gaps in national performance and help build a stronger euro around stronger central 
institutions with more sophisticated policy tools. While Eurozone labor mobility may never 
reach its potential as classical OCA Theory defined it, there is hope that younger generations will 
be more comfortable moving and working elsewhere in the currency area while hopefully 
maintaining cultural roots at home, following the recently battered yet still powerful EU motto, 
“United in Diversity.” More critical to the future viability of the euro, however, as this paper has 
argued, is the need for policymakers to drive towards closer fiscal integration in the form of a 
fiscal union. The failure of the Stability and Growth Pact is painfully evident, as restrictive rules 
combined with a harsh ideological tendency towards austerity handcuffed the policymakers of 
the most severely impacted nations in the fallout of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the effects 
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of which are still being played out today. The Maastricht regime is neither fiscal integration, nor 
a productive means to an “ever closer union,” unless it is accompanied by a larger supranational 
fiscal system. Classical Optimum Currency Area Theory has elucidated Europe’s contemporary 
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